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SO: This is Sue Onslow talking to Albie Sachs at the Lancaster Hotel, 
Bedford Place, London on Wednesday, 7th August 2013. Mr Sachs, thank 
you very much indeed for agreeing to talk to me. I wonder if you could 
begin by giving, please, your view of the role of the ‘Commonwealth 
family’ as part of your story in the anti-apartheid struggle. 
 
AS: I was a lawyer, advocate and activist, in and out of prison, and very much 
involved in activities of the ANC from a very young age. I was aged 17 and a 
second year Law student when I took part in the Defiance Campaign against 
Unjust Laws, then attended the Congress of the People in 1955 where the 
Freedom Charter was adopted. So, I was subjected to the kind of repression 
that was meted out to thousands and thousands of us in the country. As far 
as the Commonwealth is concerned… I know your story starts in 1965, when 
the Secretariat was set up, but one has to set the table back a little bit. In 
1961, Dr Verwoerd, the Prime Minister and leader of the National Party (NP), 
moved for South Africa to become a Republic. 31 May was the historic day: it 
was the day when the Anglo-Boer War finally came to an end, and that was 
the day chosen by him to declare South Africa’s Republic status after a 
whites-only referendum. My recollection of the vote is that something like 55 
percent of whites voted for the Republic and 45 percent against. It might have 
been even narrower than that. Nelson Mandela played an important role at 
that stage: he said that whites only were making a determination for the whole 
of South Africa and he called for a general strike in protest. He went 
underground, and that was when he put on the table very strongly the idea of 
a National Convention to redraft South Africa’s whole constitutional order. The 
NP Government mobilised the Army, the air force, and made a massive show 
of strength. Mandela later on was captured. 
 
SO: You’re emphasising very much the role of Mandela. What of Chief 
Lutuli? What of Oliver Tambo? 
 
AS: Mandela was the principal figure at that moment – he actually called for the 
general strike. Tambo was out of the country at this stage. And, in a sense, all 
the themes that played themselves out in later decades were already being 
established: this was an overture, if you like. I can remember working on the 
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New Age newspaper – it was a left-wing, pro-ANC weekly – and the question 
was, “Would South Africa be allowed to stay in the Commonwealth after 
declaring itself a Republic?” There was very, very heavy spending and 
promos in favour of saying, “It’s fine, it’s okay; South Africa can stay in the 
Commonwealth.” But we had our people here in London – the name Vella 
Pillay was very prominent, one of the founders of the anti-apartheid group. He 
said no, he’s been in touch with African governments and [there is] no way 
racist South Africa – declaring itself a Republic and changing its status – 
[would] be allowed to stay on in the Commonwealth. It would have to apply for 
readmission to the Commonwealth and the majority would be against. 
 
Ours was the only newspaper in South Africa that carried that story. The 
press generally had very strong statements and indications from, I think, the 
British Government and others of, “Don’t worry, chaps! It’ll be okay, we’ll keep 
you in.” It is one of those examples where we saw this massive campaign, 
using the media to create a climate facilitating apartheid South Africa 
remaining in the Commonwealth, which turned out to be completely wrong. 
So, the decision came that South Africa could not remain inside; Verwoerd 
would not be readmitted to the Commonwealth.   
 
The groupings inside the Commonwealth that were really divided on the issue 
of readmitting South Africa tended to be the groupings that played different 
roles as far as the Commonwealth itself was concerned. It was one of those 
issues that certainly rallied the African countries and the Asian countries of 
the Commonwealth on an anti-apartheid platform, whereas there wasn’t much 
solidarity between them on a whole range of other questions internally, in 
terms of African politics or Asian politics. The anti-apartheid theme was 
something that they supported quite strongly. It was a strong, unifying factor 
amongst what were then called the ‘Third World’ Commonwealth countries, 
and it was a divisive factor for the Commonwealth as a whole. By and large, 
the British Government, the Australian Government, and the New Zealand 
Government were doing what they could to keep South Africa within the fold. 
Canada was the one country that acted as something of a bridge between the 
two groups – quite overtly, and acknowledging their special role in that 
regard. You look puzzled. 
 
SO: No, I’m just thinking… After South Africa’s withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth in 1961, your newspaper must have felt vindicated in 
arguing that it was not going to be acceptable for the country to stay in 
the Commonwealth. 
 
AS: We just felt our sources were better – less tainted by spin, and much more in 
touch with the actual great majority of members of the Commonwealth. But, 
you know, we were a small paper subject to constant police harassment. The 
editors were banned, the newspaper was banned, so, it wasn’t as though we 
were able to sell thousands of copies afterwards to say we were right. But it 
was certainly a lesson to me at the time: just don’t always trust what you read 
in the newspapers! And then I would say, with Canada acting as something of 
a bridge, partly because Canadian support for anti-apartheid was stronger – 
also, we didn’t have rugby teams or cricket teams going to Canada – and I 
think it was the time of Liberal Governments there...But, partly, they wanted to 
prevent the division of the Commonwealth. They saw their role as being 
supportive of anti-apartheid struggle in principle, but also helping to keep the 
Commonwealth together and not allowing the Commonwealth to split on the 
question of South Africa. 
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At a later stage, another bridge was established through Malcolm Fraser and 
the personal role that he played. Having been the Liberal – perhaps more 
conservative – Prime Minister in Australia, he joined the Eminent Persons 
Group in 1985/86. He played a very positive role in straddling the gap that 
had emerged before what used to be called the ‘white’ Commonwealth and 
the rest – the majority of the Commonwealth. And to my mind he comes out 
very, very well in this whole story as somebody who – in a kind of modest but 
firm way, with genuine anti-apartheid convictions – contributed towards a 
climate of saying, in the end, [that] this apartheid system is just intolerable. 
The British Government, to put it mildly, was unenthusiastic, and the issues 
that would crop up weren’t simply issues now of admission or non-admission, 
because South Africa wasn’t even claiming to have a right to be readmitted. 
The issue was what to do about sanctions, and again you saw these divisions 
inside the Commonwealth. The sanctions in relation to the supply of arms got 
general support. I’d say even the British Government, I think, came on board 
with that. As for the economic boycott, there was a split right down the middle, 
with the British Government very strongly opposing economic sanctions, 
Australia and New Zealand generally supporting them, while the Canadians 
were a bit more ambivalent on that. India [was] strongly in favour; Pakistan, I 
think, in favour; and most of the Asian countries. Even Asian countries that 
were quite authoritarian and conservative took quite strong stands on the 
issue of apartheid. 
 
SO: Yesterday I was reading the transcripts behind the Nassau CHOGM 
meeting in 1985 and the Eminent Persons Group. Dr Mahathir took a 
very firm stance indeed. The CHOGM meeting minutes show the clarity 
of his statements to other Heads of Government. 
 
AS: Yes. It was a bit confusing for some of us because we were much more 
sympathetic to anti-authoritarian figures and pro-democracy figures in those 
countries. That was part of the quality of the ANC leadership: not to get drawn 
into internal political fights – or battles, anyway – and try to get maximum 
unity. You mentioned the name earlier of Oliver Tambo. I’m speaking now 
about the 1980s. Tambo was based in Zambia, which was a one-party state. 
He flew to revolutionary Mozambique – these were natural allies, there was 
solidarity between FRELIMO and the ANC – and then he flew to the Kingdom 
of Swaziland and finally to Lesotho under military rule. He wouldn’t come up 
with different statements for each country: it would be a consistent approach 
of trying to get maximum African unity which ultimately resulted in the Lusaka 
Accord, which was the real door-opener to negotiations. You know the story 
about negotiations? There’s a nice story explaining that Thabo Mbeki met a 
National Party professor in a country house in England, and they got the 
whole thing going. Those things helped, but they were really peripheral: not 
insignificant, perhaps, but only little elements and threads. 
, 
The real foundation for the opening was the Lusaka Accord, which was very 
much pioneered by Oliver Tambo, with Thabo Mbeki playing a very important 
role in that. And that set out the framework for the future negotiations to 
transform South Africa. That was not a purely Commonwealth initiative, 
although the African Commonwealth countries played a leading role in that – 
very much under the guidance of the ANC and of Oliver Tambo personally. 
 
Now, how did we feel about the Commonwealth? The answer is: ambivalent, 
because the Commonwealth itself was ambivalent. In terms of overall 
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denunciation of apartheid, there was no problem. Nobody defended 
apartheid. I think it wasn’t just for purposes of alliteration, but people 
“abhorred apartheid”. Tory governments abhorred apartheid, but… It was 
always followed by the ‘but’! I think it was Bertrand Russell who said, “The 
most powerful word in the English language is ‘but’,” and it was certainly a 
powerful word. And it was not only Tory Governments: it was not just the ‘kith 
and kin’ identification of whites with whites, nor just protecting investments. 
There was certainly a huge degree of Afro-pessimism: a feeling that 
everything would just go to pot in South Africa if a black majority government 
took over. 
 
This was certainly bound up very much with the Cold War, but that’s where 
the Asian participation is quite important. There were often very, very, very 
anti-Communist, anti-Soviet, [and] anti-China countries in Asia giving strong 
support to the anti-apartheid movement. So, this fuelled that ambivalence and 
I personally felt – and I’ve written about this – the ambivalence of having been 
received as a refugee in England twice. Not just once, but twice! There was a 
body which is now called CARA. 
 
SO: The Council for Assisting Refugee Academics? It was renamed in 1999. 
 
AS: Yes, and I was received by the predecessor organisation, the Society for the 
Protection of Science and Learning, when I arrived as a mental wreck after 
solitary confinement in South Africa. That was in 1966. I had such 
ambivalence towards the UK because, on the one hand, it was a country that 
was willing to receive me – I would walk on Hampstead Heath and watch the 
kites flying and I couldn’t believe that I wouldn’t be arrested and locked up 
and put in solitary confinement the next day. It was just amazing. And I 
appreciated the fact it was a country to which I could go, and I could study, 
and I could write and I could publish. On the other hand, I kept feeling that if 
Britain hadn’t effectively been involved in the conquest of South Africa and 
the establishment of the white-dominated state in 1910, we wouldn’t have the 
struggles over apartheid. That same theme of the British Empire was now 
reflected in terms of the British Government’s stalling and blocking of effective 
sanctions against apartheid South Africa. 
 
The idea of sanctions was to minimise the need for an armed struggle. It 
wasn’t there just to punish and destroy; it was seen as part of a strategy that 
would be relatively non-violent. So, here I am, I’m torn, and anybody who’s 
worked with refugees knows this. You also put on to your host state a lot of 
your anger, because you can’t get at those who’ve displaced you: they’re too 
far away. So, you get at the features of the society that’s receiving you that 
reminds you of the negative aspects. And then I would feel, “This is crazy. I’m 
here in the UK being given every opportunity to establish a family life, to do a 
PhD and to have books published, and yet I’ve still got a bit of rage inside 
me.” Ambivalence. 
 
When I came the second time, in 1988, I came as a physical wreck. I’d been 
blown up: I was semi-conscious; I’d lost an arm. It was when I was blown up 
in Mozambique by a bomb put in my car by South African security agents. I 
came literally on a stretcher, and what had such a big impact on me, really, 
was the nursing I got in the London hospitals. So, the first time was ‘66. I go 
to Mozambique in ’77, and I’m blown up and come back in ‘88. And there was 
just something about the hands of the nurses – cleaning my wounds, 
changing the bandages, just the touch – that gave me an affection and love 
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for the UK that I hadn’t had before. Respect, admiration, people I loved… I 
loved working with people involved in anti-apartheid, arguing with others and 
all the rest. This I had had in spades when I had come the first time as a 
refugee. But this was something deeper than just respect and admiration. 
This was physical, intimate and deeply caring contact. It made me love being 
in London. I was so thrilled when I recently saw the Olympic Games opening 
ceremony – the big show – which gave the National Health Service a huge 
thumbs up, because it really spoke to me. I’d been lying in exactly one of 
those hospital beds. 
 
SO: Yes, the NHS is a religion here. 
 
AS: It signified a lot to me and it helped to reduce that sense of ambivalence. The 
last little story that I will tell in this floating around, stream of consciousness 
reminiscing is [that] I met the Queen once. It was the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies (ICwS) that arranged a visit to the Palace. Dr Shula 
Marks was the Director then, and she arranged for a busload of us [to go]. I 
was established in the South African Constitutional Study Centre at the ICwS 
after I’d got out of hospital. We all lined up, and I still remember seeing short 
Shula Marks with her handbag chatting to short Her Majesty with her 
handbag, nattering away. It was nice. 
 
SO: That’s a charming image! 
 
AS: It was very lovely, actually. Then it was my turn, and you’ve got like ten 
seconds, so I quickly said that Oliver Tambo – this would have been 1988, I 
think – had mentioned that if democracy came to South Africa, there could 
very well be a return to the Commonwealth. I mentioned that to her, knowing 
that she was very interested in the Commonwealth. So, I managed to turn 
even a handshake with Her Majesty… 
 
SO: Do you recall what she said in response to that? 
 
AS: No. She noted [it], she heard it; I could see she registered. I think she said 
something about [how] she knew Oliver Tambo. She said something gracious 
about him, so it was a gracious response without committing to anything, and 
[she gave] some indication that she would be happy to see South Africa back 
in the Commonwealth. It was something like that. We’re fighting on all fronts 
in the anti-apartheid struggle, so if I could get ten seconds of a statement to 
that effect, then I would.  
 
On the Commonwealth in South Africa today… I’m going to put it in a double 
negative: it’s not unimportant. I think that sense of family is there. I think 
people appreciate very much the diversity of the Commonwealth: they see the 
diversity as a great strength of the Commonwealth – that it’s got North/South, 
and includes very developed countries. The broad commitment to democracy 
against army coups and negotiations… I think these are themes that appeal. 
South Africa had done an opinion poll when Mozambique joined the 
Commonwealth [and] it seemed to make a lot of sense to South Africans. So, 
I can’t put it stronger than that. It’s not an important association, but it’s not an 
unimportant one either! South Africa belongs to the UN; it belongs to BRICS – 
that’s Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. [It belongs] to the African 
Union: it pays a lot of attention to the African Union, and then you get talk 
about the English-speaking countries, the French-speaking countries, but you 
don’t hear about the Commonwealth countries. It’s the English-
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speaking/French-speaking distinction which would be the division that is 
referred to. 
 
SO: So, is there a lasting and residual memory of how key Commonwealth 
countries or key elements of Commonwealth civil society contributed to 
the end of apartheid? Or has that dissipated? 
 
AS: I think there’s appreciation – very much strengthened by the Eminent Persons 
Group and Malcolm Fraser, which made it seem less divisive than it had 
been. But the Commonwealth was certainly promotional of and supportive of 
change as a large body. It put a fair amount of pressure on apartheid South 
Africa; it contributed in that way. But, at the same time, that’s very diluted by 
Margaret Thatcher calling Mandela a “terrorist”, and it wasn’t like a word she 
let slip at one particular unguarded moment and then was too proud to 
withdraw it. That’s what she really thought. 
 
SO: It’s said that Mrs Thatcher had a particular hostility to three-letter 
acronym movements: the PLO, the IRA, and the ANC. [Laughter] So, 
there is a residual sense in South Africa of the Commonwealth’s role, 
but one which varies depending on which political constituency. After 
all, time has moved on in South Africa since 1994. 
 
 So, if I could go back and ask a number of questions from what you’ve 
just said… I’ve noted your sense of ambivalence while you were here in 
the UK that first time, after 1966. In your anti-apartheid activities, to what 
extent were you very involved with the Anti-Apartheid Movement 
(AAM)? Was Abdul Minty’s role as Secretary of the AAM important to 
you? Was contact with the Secretariat at Marlborough House part of 
your activities in any way? 
 
AS: No, not mine. So, when I speak about ambivalence, even the ambivalence 
was ambivalent! It wasn’t something that I walked around with – anger in my 
heart twenty-four hours a day. It was just the whole damn setup, and then it 
would be triggered by the support of the Marylebone Cricket Club for cricket 
tours, always finding excuses, and so that would trigger it. At the same time, 
we met fantastic British people – and lots of them, from all sectors. I 
remember once marching from Coventry to Birmingham in an anti-apartheid 
march and there might have been thirty of us. There was an Anglican cleric, I 
think, and a couple of other clerics and some university lecturers and then 
certainly trade union people; somebody from the community. It was pretty 
eclectic. If you were doing a film and you wanted to select slightly eccentric, 
oblique characters, you’d have chosen these. There were about thirty of us, 
including myself in that list, and as we were walking in to Birmingham, the 
Birmingham City football crowd were emerging [from their stadium], walking 
the other way, and we seemed such a tiny little group going upstream – like a 
salmon battling to get through. [Laughter] 
 
 There were a lot of people, and a lot of support from Scotland. I’ve just got a 
couple of honorary degrees from Scotland. And I don’t quite know why, 
specifically but from Edinburgh, from Glasgow and elsewhere in Scotland. 
And it cut across parties: David Steel was a very strong supporter from the 
Liberal Party, and the Labour Party, and many more on the Left. It was 
encouraging and exciting. Perhaps the highlight of all that was the Free 
Mandela concert at Wembley. I hadn’t been long out of hospital, so it would 
have been 1988, [Mandela’s] seventieth or something birthday. It was my first 
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pop concert, and I don’t know what you do at a pop concert. You stand up 
and say, “Hey, hey, hey!” and wave your arms up – well, I’ve only got one-
and-a-half arms. And there were 70,000 young people and one older guy, me, 
and it turned out it wasn’t so difficult. But that was 70,000 young British 
people who, at that stage, were being referred to as ‘yobs’ and not interested 
in politics. The feeling was just tremendous, and the pop stars were there and 
great singers from all over the world. This was so heart-warming, and [Sings] 
“Free Nelson Mandela”, you know, it wasn’t just… 
 
SO: So, that sense of solidarity that really crossed boundaries? 
 
AS: Very, very strongly. Very strongly. And it was a unifying thing in Britain itself. 
So, it wasn’t just the diversity of appearance and politics and geographical 
diversity in the Commonwealth. Inside Britain, you know, there were black 
Britons and white Britons and Britons of Asian origin and they were all at that 
concert. The level and the intensity of emotion! This was for freedom, and it 
was very marvellous for us to feel [that] South Africa, the “polecat of the 
world”, had created its opposite, the anti-apartheid movement, in a broad 
sense, that brought people together. In a sense, these were elements that 
helped us to get our ultimate constitution. We didn’t get much in our 
constitution, interestingly, while I mention this, from the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Ah, Carolyn McMaster said that actually you did. I wanted to ask you 
about that. When I interviewed her, she expressly said about inviting 
people who were drafting the South African Constitution, such as 
yourself, to Canada, and that there had been a degree of policy input. 
Also, the Canadian Bill of Rights – which had been, of course, drafted 
and passed in 1982 – formed an important input in to the South African 
constitution. 
 
AS: That’s absolutely right, and I stand very corrected. But the things that Canada 
contributed were almost in spite of the Commonwealth history. 
 
SO: If I could go back a little bit, though, because after all Canada sent 
Archbishop Edward Scott as part of the Eminent Persons Group in 1986. 
They went down to South Africa – or rather southern Africa, because 
they visited other capitals before they arrived in South Africa – in early 
1986. Did you meet them when they came to Maputo? 
 
AS: No, I wasn’t in the upper echelons of the ANC. I was never a full-time ANC 
person, no. In terms of the anti-apartheid input, that was very varied but was 
quite powerful, and the Commonwealth as a whole – in spite of the reluctance 
of the UK almost all the way through to take effective measures against 
apartheid, and Australia most of the time, New Zealand most of the time, and 
Canada more ambiguous on that… 
 
SO: That’s interesting, because Brian Mulroney and Joe Clark were really 
consistent in their determination to end apartheid. 
 
AS: Yes, Joe Clark also played a very positive role, now you’re mentioning the 
name. And Brian Mulroney. But that’s different from the constitutional text… 
 
SO: Absolutely. 
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AS: …and there the whole theme of parliamentary sovereignty was a barrier to 
what we wanted to achieve. We got two things from Canada: one very 
positive and the other negative. The positive one – and you’re quite right to 
point it out – was the Charter of Rights and the whole approach of Oliver 
Tambo in terms of what was called the ‘interests of the minority’, which really 
meant the interests of the very privileged and, generally speaking, pretty well-
off whites. He said [that this was] to be achieved not through any special 
elements of the constitution directed at whites, such as the Lancaster House 
Constitution for Zimbabwe had had, but through a fundamental Bill of Rights 
that would protect everybody – the majority and minority – as human beings, 
with rights of association, religion, language, culture and so on. In that sense, 
from a drafting structural point of view, the Canadian Charter of Human 
Rights played a very, very significant role. 
 
The negative aspect was in terms of federalism. Often I’m asked about what 
countries we drew upon. I mention the United States for the basic separation 
of powers, Canada for the Charter – which became the Bill of Rights – but 
also then Germany for the constitutional court and cooperative federalism, 
cooperative governments, and Namibia for the non-racial ideal. And from 
India we actually got the Fiscal Commission. Everybody happened to tell us 
their country was the best for constitutional models – even people from the 
UK, who didn’t have a constitution, said theirs was the best! – except the 
Canadian experts on federalism, who said, “Whatever you do, don’t follow our 
position, because we have got competitive federalism and it doesn’t work. In 
fact, we overcome it by informal meetings between [provincial] Premiers and 
the central government. It’s not recognised in the Constitution at all.” They 
told us, “Don’t follow our example, follow the German and the Swiss approach 
to federalism. Go for co-operative rather than competitive federalism.” 
 
So, what was novel in South Africa, then, was having a Constitutional Court – 
although this was not completely new because, in effect, Canada’s Supreme 
Court was a Constitutional Court – and an entrenched Bill of Rights. India 
also had an entrenched Bill of Rights, which is fairly narrow and limited, but 
the Indian judiciary had high prestige in South Africa: the judiciary from the 
70s, the 80s, [and] the 90s, at a very important time for us. So, the concept of 
the Charter came from Canada and also brilliant jurisprudence from Canada. 
The first court after the Charter is called the Dixon-Wilson Court. Chief Justice 
Dixon and Bertha Wilson were two who really helped to establish a new, 
contemporary way of analysing rights in a social setting, and we drew heavily 
on that. In India, there was a passion and a role for the courts in giving some 
voice to the marginalised and the disadvantaged in a way that the other 
organs of government weren’t doing. So, that was an impulse that was quite 
important. Whereas before, South African courts would look to the House of 
Lords [and] to some extent Australia and New Zealand… 
 
SO: Old Commonwealth? 
 
AS: Old Commonwealth decisions. When we got going under our new 
constitution, we got almost nothing of value from them because of that old 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty, in which judicial review operates in 
relation to subordinate legislation but not in relation to primary legislation. 
None of that was appropriate to us. 
 
Now, I like to think that we ourselves have in turn contributed something 
strong to the Commonwealth family in terms of acting as a bridge towards 
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acceptance of the fundamental rights notion – striking down Acts of 
Parliament, which we do quite often, and our courts haven’t been reluctant 
when called upon to do so – and living in a constitutional state, where there 
are no vacuums. We got rid of the idea of the Royal prerogative, for example. 
There’s no state prerogative in South Africa: the constitution rules, okay! So, 
there were other themes like that. I had, I suppose, a rather amusing 
conversation…Growing up in an anti-monarchist family, I seem to find 
occasions to mention conversations I’ve had with Royals! This was with 
Princess Anne in South Africa. I was asking why was it [that], when we were 
looking to different countries for models, we actually got very little from the UK 
constitutionally, and very little also from other countries we admired very 
much – Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark. These were open, 
social democratic countries, with great respect for basic human rights, but 
also caring societies. But the constitutions there played a very small role in 
public life. So, I told Princess Anne I had come to the conclusion that it was 
only when the King was killed that you had to replace the sovereign with a 
written document or constitutional charter identifying and regulating sovereign 
power. Where the Royals survived, you had a largely unwritten deal between 
the middle classes and the sovereign, who became a constitutional monarch. 
Now, the sovereign is gone because the monarchy had been abolished – or, 
in the case of the United States, the colonial rule had been repudiated. In 
France, the monarchy is abolished so you need a written constitution and the 
written constitution then defines power in a way that’s binding on all the 
institutions of state. So, Princess Anne said, “Well, I do hope that regicide will 
not be required in the United Kingdom to get a Bill of Rights there.” [Laughter] 
 
SO: But that suggests that here, in the UK, there’s a strong social contract 
that isn’t dependent upon a constitution – that we have 
constitutionalism without actually having a formal constitution? 
 
AS: Yes. If you ask me which country I would rather be locked up in: France, the 
United States or the UK… France and the US have very strong constitutions, 
playing an important role in public life, whereas the UK has elements of a 
constitution but [these] can be overridden by Parliament at any stage. They 
are not, in that sense, fundamental rights. I’d rather be locked up in the UK! 
And that’s to do with the general culture, the political culture, and the society. 
The fact is [that] it works here, because deals have been done historically 
between the Royals and the middle class, [and] then between the middle 
class and the working class. Practices have been established: ways of doing 
things that are very powerful. And you can have a constitution as you had in 
the United States and still have slavery. My knowledge of the French legal 
system is based mainly on Georges Simenon novels, but they didn’t make me 
want to feel that I’d rather be locked up in a French prison on a particular 
charge than in an English gaol! 
 
SO: Albie, if I could just take you back to your first time in Britain and then 
again to your second time, and also your involvement in writing the 
South African Constitution… How far were you intellectually linked to 
the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the late 1960s and 1970s? 
Shula become Director of the Institute in 1983 and was a leading 
member of the anti-apartheid movement here, in the intellectual sphere, 
and is of course a South African herself. 
 
AS: In the late 1960s, I was working on my PhD and I don’t remember…I might 
have given a paper at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. I was 
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registered at Sussex University. Most of the chapters of my thesis – which 
became chapters of my book, Justice in South Africa, I’d presented as 
seminar papers first. But I don’t recall the ICwS as being very important at 
that stage for us. Certainly in 1988 – for me, personally. Shula Marks and 
Mary Simons came to see me: I’d just come out of hospital. I was physically 
very frail, very weak, and Shula asked what was I planning to do. I said I’d 
been offered a Fellowship at Warwick University, and [that] Christchurch 
University in New Zealand had offered me a temporary position. They said, 
“Well, what would you like to do?” And I said, “I’d love to work full time on 
preparing for a new constitution for South Africa,” and Shula said, “Great! 
We’ve got a bathroom upstairs in the ICwS building which we can convert into 
an office, and I’m sure we’ll get funding from the Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA) and Ford Foundation.” A few weeks later, I was 
in that office, with funding as anticipated. 
 
SO: So, this was the old building on Russell Square? 
 
AS: Yes, yes. And I did a lot of work there: I met people, I wrote papers on religion 
[and] on freedom of speech in the new South Africa, on the future of the 
whites in South Africa, on judges and gender. It was a marvellous period. 
 
SO: Yes. So, you were based at the Institute for two years? 
 
AS: I was there maybe even a little longer, and I commuted from there to South 
Africa after 1990 for a while. Then I transferred the Centre to South Africa – it 
was the South African Constitution Studies Centre. Those years gave me the 
time to sit down and think, to do a bit of research and write up the implications 
of what were really the ANC’s approaches to all these issues, to spell them 
out. I think they would have been read certainly by lawyers on the other side: 
by people interested to know what the ANC’s positions were. The advantage 
was [that] I was doing this as a professor. So, people knew I was from the 
ANC, but if it’s an official ANC document then you have to send it to the 
committee, the National Executive, and they disagree with this formulation or 
that formulation and nothing ever gets out and everything formally approved 
becomes rather bland. So, that was very, very positive. I think it was then that 
I met Chandrika Kumaratunga: she was in exile, I was in exile, and she went 
on to become President in Sri Lanka. I met people from the West Indies – 
that’s what stands out in my memory. One of them, I forget even her name, 
but she wrote about West Indian women being “the other of the other”. That 
was quite a striking concept at that stage. 
 
SO: So, were the Commonwealth Lawyers Association or the 
Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges Association particularly 
valuable networks for you? I’m just trying to think of the wider 
Commonwealth ‘family’. 
 
AS: It wasn’t for me at that stage; I wasn’t a judge. Afterwards, after I became a 
judge, I went to a couple of the Commonwealth Lawyers Association 
meetings. The first one I went to was in Cyprus. I think that was before I was 
a judge, and that was just a place to push ANC and their positions. And then I 
went years later to one in Melbourne, [and] two years ago [to the meeting] in 
Hyderabad. I missed the one in Cape Town this year. 
 
SO: Going back to 1988… While you were writing papers concerning ANC 
positions on important reconfigurations of the South African 
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Constitution, were you liaising with members of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat? Were they providing information, intellectual support or 
administrative support in any way? 
 
AS: Not to me. The one person I had contact with was Reg Austin, whom I’d 
stayed with in Zimbabwe when he was Dean of the Law School at the 
University of Zimbabwe. I’d been an external examiner, and we’d been friends 
for a number of years. And I remember him writing to me from the 
Commonwealth Secretariat [where he was then Director of Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs], and I remember exchanging interesting notes. But I 
don’t think that actually got anywhere. Maybe he moved on. 
 
SO: What of the internal politics of constitution-making in South Africa? The 
story you presented earlier suggested a united phalanx of those who 
were rewriting the constitution. But how hard fought was it internally 
within the ANC, quite apart from dealing with the other side? Where 
should I look to for a good summary of that? 
 
AS: You’ll have to wait for an oral history [that] some of us are working on; which 
could take a year or two. For the internal things. I don’t think it’s come out 
anywhere. I’ve got thirteen hours of transcripts on discussions we had in 
Lusaka in 1997-98 about which way to go. Are you going to Cape Town at 
all? 
 
SO: I will be, yes. I’m going back there. I’ve been down to South Africa twice 
for this project, but… 
 
AS: All right, you’ll go to the Mayibuye Centre… 
 
SO: It’s in the Mayibuye Centre, is it? 
 
AS: Yes. But it is a lot of material, and we’re still working out a sort of index to it. 
But you’ll see some of the earliest discussions we had. One of them deals 
with a paper that I’d prepared for the Constitution Committee of the ANC – 
which was set up by Oliver Tambo for the National Executive – on three 
models for a future constitution order. The one would be your classical 
constitution in which the constitution limits government; your second would be 
a people’s power constitution in which there’s a revolutionary party that’s 
central to the function of the state; and the third is what I called a ‘post-
dictatorship constitution’. I knew that, if you gave them those options, people 
would go for the third one. The third one meant you didn’t have a constitution 
simply to limit the impact of majority rule; rather, that the constitution had to 
play a role in the reconstruction of institutions, in introducing new values in 
the country and achieving equality – an active, dynamic constitution. And after 
some debate, that third one was accepted. Oliver Tambo never had any 
doubts himself. From 1958, when he had worked on the ANC Statutes with 
Albert Lutuli – who was then President of the ANC – they introduced the non-
racial vision of ANC membership, even though it took twenty years before it 
came to be actually applied. And he believed in the Bill of Rights: that became 
ANC policy in, I think, 1987, when the ANC opted clearly for multi-party 
democracy, and in 1988, for an entrenched Bill of Rights. That had nothing to 
do with the fall of the Berlin Wall. I think Perestroika helped in the sense of 
diminishing the hard ideological positions that some people had adopted 
inside. 
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SO: Can I ask you something from my own research point of view? How 
important do you think was the position of the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) within the ANC as a broad church? How far 
did you see it as being a key, influential factor in its ideological 
approach, or was it more because of the relationship with Moscow? 
 
AS: I think the South African Communist Party was important for several reasons. 
First, very early in its life it became a non-racial organisation and for decades 
was the only multi-racial or non-racial political body in South Africa. Second, it 
had a vision of struggle, transformation, revolution, [and] change that people 
in ANC and elsewhere found to be very attractive. Third, its members by and 
large were very dedicated – willing to go into the trenches and work hard, [to] 
give their lives for the struggle. Finally, they included people who’d been in 
the white South African Army in World War II, had carried guns, who knew 
how to use explosives and played an important role in the establishment of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe. 
  
 So, those were all important factors. In terms of ideology, although the Party 
tended to be pro-Soviet as against pro-Chinese, pro-Soviet as against the 
West, it got quite a lot of material backing in terms of military training but also 
technical training, studying and so on. That counted quite a lot. I think that 
was one of the reasons why also the Scandinavian countries came strongly to 
the table: it was to prevent, as they saw it, undue Soviet influence. 
 
SO: So, the Nordic countries really pushed for neutralism? 
 
AS: You know, when ANC was getting very little from the West… Extremely little. 
Just abhorring apartheid, but no solid support. It was strong support and 
material support – not for the armed struggle, but anything short of the armed 
struggle. 
 
SO: Tor Sellstrom has written about the role of the Nordic countries [i.e. 
Sweden and National Liberation in South Africa] and I know that the 
South African Democracy Educational Trust (SADET) has really 
emphasised the role of the Nordic countries in the volumes it has 
published. 
 
AS: And it was very, very significant. The hard ideological/political issues didn’t 
impinge very much on South Africa, and happily the interference from the 
state security organs and so on of countries calling themselves socialist 
countries would have been minimal. We were fighting on South African soil; 
we were fighting for freedom in South Africa. Albert Lutuli often said, “If I want 
to know what the workers are thinking, I call Moses Kotane.” And Kotane, the 
non-believing General Secretary of the Communist Party, loved going to 
speak to Albert Lutuli, who was a very staunch Christian. So, somehow the 
hard ideological divisions that might have applied elsewhere were much 
softer in South Africa. 
 
SO: Yes, I was going to say that these boundaries seem much more blurred, 
more porous. 
 
AS: Yes. And to the extent that the South African Communist Party accepted 
National Liberation as being the central theme of transformation and rejected 
the idea of a pure working class struggle to establish socialism, the gap was 
very slight. You probably find most of our generation of ANC leaders were in 
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the Communist Party until 1990. So, Thabo Mbeki was a leading member of 
the Communist Party and he became… 
 
SO: So, you would not be surprised if Professor Stephen Ellis was right 
when he writes that Nelson Mandela had indeed been a member in the 
1960s? 
 
AS: Oh, Stephen Ellis is rubbish! I’m sorry to put it that crudely, but… Walter 
Sisulu was the General Secretary of the Communist Party. Mandela worked 
closely with the Communist Party. You didn’t have membership lists and 
Party cards and anything like that. But Sisulu had a very high up position, and 
he was the most marvellous, wonderful person. On Robben Island, somebody 
took me round the first time. They said, “We all used to go to Mandela when 
we had problems. But who did he go to? He went to Walter Sisulu.” 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
AS: And there were other people like Bram Fischer [and] Yusuf Dadoo: strong, 
very admired figures in the public/political life, inside and outside the ANC. 
 
SO: So, between 1990 and 1994, while you were focussing on the drafting of 
the Constitution of South Africa, you’ve made reference to Reg Austin 
and your personal links with him. To what extent were you aware of 
what the Commonwealth was trying to do to assist in promoting 
transition? The new Secretary General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, was 
sending Moses Anafu as his representative, along with other observers, 
down to KwaZulu Natal, trying to assist in whatever way possible to 
reduce the violence there. [They were] offering training for the police, 
offering independent advice and support to help in whatever way 
possible. Did this feature, as far as you were concerned? Were you 
aware of it, or was this just not part of your remit? 
 
AS: It wasn’t the front on which I was working. 
 
SO: No. Fair enough. 
 
AS: I do remember Canadians sending experts on public administration to actually 
train people. They were very direct and very valuable, and they were good 
people. Very good people. In terms of the peacekeeping aspects, that wasn’t 
the area that I was involved in. 
 
SO: Oh, these Commonwealth representatives from the Secretariat were 
more monitors than peacekeepers. They were small groups that were 
going into KwaZulu Natal… Moses Anafu was known as ‘Mr Africa’ in 
the Commonwealth Secretariat. 
 
AS: Yes, but by ‘peacekeeping’ I mean supporting peacekeeping. Now that you 
remind me, I do recall special efforts to promote peace between ANC and 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in Natal. Who was the Secretary General before 
Chief Emeka? 
 
SO: Sonny Ramphal. 
 
AS: Yes, he stood out as a great supporter of the anti-apartheid movement, and 
he gave more ‘umph’. He acted with more ‘umph’ and panache, and gave a 
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lot of moral support. This was moral and political support at important 
moments, and that I remember very specifically. 
 
SO: So, before 1994, then, you’re painting a picture of the Commonwealth 
family assisting towards transition to black majority government in 
myriad and diverse ways – toward the Government of National Unity of 
April 1994. There was Commonwealth support in the first independent 
and secret multi-party elections in South Africa in April 1994. Since 
then, there appears to have been a dissipation of the perception of the 
contribution of the Commonwealth towards the end of apartheid? 
 
AS: I would say that the Commonwealth played a very supportive role: lots of 
observers in the elections came from Commonwealth countries and I think 
even directly through the Commonwealth. I don’t think it was just bilateral. 
And I met some of them at that stage and it was an exciting period. It seemed 
like a miracle, and people were inspired and encouraged and it worked two 
ways. I remember that as being quite valuable. I’m not sure if the 
Commonwealth played a role with the Goldstone Commission earlier than 
that. I do know that a former Chief Justice of India, PN Bhagwati, sat on the 
Commission, and that might have been arranged through the Commonwealth. 
I know the issue of transforming the police was a very lively issue. 
 
SO: What also of the particular contribution of the Front Line States as 
individual Commonwealth members? Did you have a particular view of 
the role of Zimbabwe, say, between 1980 and 1994? 
 
AS: The Front Line States played a crucial role and paid a very heavy price. The 
strongest participants were, without a doubt, Angola and Mozambique – but 
they weren’t in the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Botswana was compromised by its geographic position. 
 
AS: Yes, Lesotho [was] also under heavy constraints with the military and the 
King, which was a very complicated set up. Swaziland was virtually ruled by 
South Africa. Nevertheless, they were key states for people to escape to and 
to come back in to the country from. And then Zimbabwe. It was complicated 
by the fact that, historically, ZANU had had close relations with the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC), not with the ANC, and was very cool towards the 
ANC. 
 
SO: Did that relationship not change after ZANU [which became ZANU-PF in 
the Unity Accord of 1987] came to power in 1980? Isn’t too much made 
of this historic link between ZANU and the PAC, whereas in reality the 
relationship between ZANU and the ANC altered and improved post-
1980? 
 
AS: It didn’t change. It was modified, and I believe, towards the end, maybe, there 
would certainly have been varying degrees of support from Zimbabwe. Even 
in the case of Mozambique, there would be the 1984 Nkomati Accord, but it 
didn’t stop people passing through. It certainly didn’t stop the South Africans 
from grossly violating the Nkomati agreement through continued support for 
RENAMO. But Zambia was a very crucial state. 
 
SO: Yes, of course. 
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AS: For all the criticism people had of Kenneth Kaunda – his personalised mode 
of leadership and one-Party rule and so on – there was a consistency of 
support there which was highly appreciated. Tanzania was very important, 
particularly in the Julius Nyerere period. Not just with the ANC camps there, 
but strong political support, as well. 
 
SO: In terms of your personal story, did you benefit particularly from 
intellectual support, solidarity, material support, links with Zimbabwean 
lawyers, or advice on constitution-building? I’m trying to think of the 
specifics, in addition to your comments on the consistency of political 
support. 
 
AS: In the case of Zimbabwe, very, very little. I enjoyed my work at the University 
of Zimbabwe as external examiner in their Law Department. I met some 
excellent people there, one of them being Welshman Ncube. There were a 
whole range of others. Interesting conversations with Walter Kamba, whom 
I’d known in exile: I’d known him first at the University of Cape Town, and 
then in exile in London, and then he became the Principal of the University. 
But the country that, for me, was very significant was Mozambique. It was not 
in the Commonwealth, but the whole different philosophy and ethos and 
intelligentsia, [the] ways of framing issues… 
 
SO: Yes, in other words, a particularly non-Commonwealth way of doing 
things! Despite their later joining the Commonwealth in 1995. 
 
AS: But Tanzania was more important. I taught at the University at Dar es Salam 
for one term – at the time of Ujamaa and Julius Nyerere. That was an 
important intellectual centre. It was a critical approach to law: law in the 
service of emancipation and humanity rather than a purely technical law as an 
instrument of control. So, Tanzania, I would say, was intellectually influential. 
The government gave a lot of support to the military and a lot of political 
support – consistent political support – all the way through. 
 
SO: In terms of actual intellectual ideas, obviously South Africa has Roman 
Dutch Law and you did your first degree in law in South Africa. Your 
fellow drafters of the Constitution…Were they all similarly educated 
within the South African system? Or were you drawing upon different 
Commonwealth legal intellectual threads in the framing of the 
Constitution? 
 
AS: Roman Dutch Law as such played no role. It was part of our history. One of 
the articles I wrote whilst I was at the South African Constitutional Study 
Centre was on the future of Roman Dutch Law. It had become South African 
law, and would take its place, but in the framework of the new Constitution 
Order. The answer is [that] we drew very little on other than what I’ve 
mentioned. Canada – their Charter was very significant. Advice from 
Canadians: don’t follow their model of competitive federalism. Practical 
support from Canada in terms of training people – preparing people to be in 
the Civil Service [and] in the administration, if I remember very specifically.  In 
my own case, meeting Canadian judges. In 1998, I went to a conference of 
the Judicial Training Institute held in Newfoundland, and I thought I should go 
there to pick up some gravitas – that the Canadian judges would be very 
down-the-line and serious.   
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The first judge I met was Claire L’Heureux-Dubé. “Albie,” she said to me 
afterwards, “I need you! You must come to Sri Lanka. We are educating the 
men judges in being less chauvinistic!” “Albie, we must go to Nepal.” And I 
went both times. Her close friend was Rosalie Abella – she’s now on the 
Supreme Court of Canada. She’s marvellous and seen as a bit unusual on a 
whole range of issues: a very strong, intellectually brilliant feminist. She 
doesn’t walk like a judge and talk like a judge or surround herself with all the 
boring paraphernalia of a judge. Her place is filled with interesting, 
provocative art. And so I didn’t pick up gravitas! 
 
SO: But it was very refreshing! 
 
AS: It was marvellous. I made great friendships, and it was very invigorating 
intellectually. Very important. And that was with the Canadian judges, I would 
say, more than anywhere else. I also to some extent became friendly with 
Bhagwati from India. We chatted a bit about their approach and philosophy in 
India, receiving letters from prisoners and dealing with the marginalised, the 
poor, changing the whole role that the judiciary had been playing, from being 
highly formalistic – very pedantic, very British, if you like, very old-fashioned 
Commonwealth in its character – to redefining what Commonwealth law could 
be like, introducing quite a lot. Michael Kirby from Australia became a great 
friend of many of us, and it was partly his style but also his openness, his 
approach, and his concern for human rights. As a creative legal thinker, he 
played a very, very positive role. We cited some Australian judgements 
afterwards, although I’m not sure if we ever cited Michael Kirby in our actual 
decisions. And there was one New Zealand Chief Justice, Robin Cooke, who 
also served on the Privy Council, who became quite friendly with our Chief 
Justice Arthur Chaskalson. He also had quite a big influence. He was very 
forward looking from a New Zealand point of view, and quite distinguished – 
serving on the Privy Council in London. 
 
SO: So, you’re outlining a Commonwealth network of ideas and personal 
friendships – a cross-fertilisation of ideas – rather than formal 
Commonwealth structures. 
 
AS: Well, you see, you say ‘Commonwealth’, yet it wasn’t through the 
Commonwealth as an institution. I had connections with German judges. One, 
in particular, Dieter Grimm, was very influential for me. I met judges from the 
European Court of Human Rights, and there was a chap, Isi Foighel… I’d 
often cite comments that he made to me at an important moment. I’m friendly 
with a number of US Supreme Court Judges. So, it wasn’t like a 
Commonwealth coterie. Enoch Dumbutshena and Anthony Gubbay from 
Zimbabwe were quite important at a certain moment. For very good, serious, 
thoughtful judgements – in the modern idiom, ‘pro-human rights’ – that would 
have been decisions in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
 
SO: Albie, thank you. You’ve done a terrific job in setting the Commonwealth 
– in its various guises and forms – firmly in context in South Africa’s 
transition from apartheid, so that we shouldn’t over-inflate its 
importance but, as you say, it’s not been insignificant. Thanks very 
much indeed. 
 
 [END OF AUDIOFILE] 
 
 
